



# Mapping Local Perspectives on Radicalization in Kosovo

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## Community Building Mitrovica (CBM)

Community Building Mitrovica (CBM) is a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) operating in the field of peace and community building in the wider region of Mitrovica, northern municipalities of Kosovo.

## Kosovo Institute for Peace (KIP)

Kosovo Institute of Peace (KIP) is a non-governmental, non-partisan, and not-for-profit foundation committed to promoting local and innovative perspectives to understand, anticipate, and promote peace practices, as well as committed to prevent, reduce, and transform conflictual relations in Kosovo.

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# Executive summary

Since the eruption of violent conflict in Syria and Iraq and the travelling of around 400 Kosovo citizens to the region between 2012 and 2016, fear of radicalization and violent extremism became a prevalent issue in Kosovo. This attracted significant international attention which pushed the Government of Kosovo to take strong legal and punitive measures to counter violent extremism and prevent the rise of religious radicalization in the country. While extensive research is conducted in understanding the causes and dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, mostly at the national level, less work is done in exploring the perspectives of local frontline actors on the prevalence of and response to this phenomenon at the municipal level. Drawing on interviews with local stakeholders across Kosovo, this study explores local perspectives on religious radicalization Kosovo. The study aims to map out the scope and meaning of religious radicalization that can potentially lead to violent extremism in Kosovo and explore the impact of existing policies and strategies for preventing and countering radicalization in the country. In particular, the study aims to understand the local sources of insecurity; stakeholders' perception on violent extremism; functionality of municipal security mechanisms; and strategies for preventing and addressing radicalization at the communal level.

Mapping out local perspectives on radicalization in Kosovo requires in-depth knowledge from municipal stakeholders, which can be best generated through semi-structured interviews that cover the territory of Kosovo and all ethnic and religious communities. Between February and March 2021, 160 semi-structured interviews were conducted in 34 municipalities of Kosovo. In each municipality we have interviewed five types of local stakeholders: municipal representative and community safety officers; local police officers; members of Municipal Assembly; local civil society activists; and religious community representatives.

The main finding of this study is that **RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED RADICALIZATION IS NOT CONSIDERED A MAJOR SECURITY THREAT IN KOSOVO. INSTEAD, THERE ARE OTHER MORE PRESSING EMPLACED AND EVERYDAY INSECURITIES THAT CONCERN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN THE COUNTRY.** The main sources of local insecurity are mostly everyday and emplaced issues

which tend to feature in almost all municipalities regardless of the ethnic background or economic development. Local stakeholders have stated that majority of sources of insecurity concern personal and community safety, such as: domestic violence, theft and ordinary crimes, abuse with narcotics, environmental degradation, and job insecurity. While these sources are both of temporal and structural in nature, local stakeholders admit that they can directly and indirectly contribute to deviant social behaviours, including radicalization and violent extremism.

**RADICALIZATION IN THE PAST WAS CAUSED AND ENABLED BY THREE SETS OF FACTORS: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INJUSTICE AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE; RELIGIOUS MISINFORMATION AND BRAINWASHING BY INFORMAL PREACHERS; AND CULTURAL INDIFFERENCE AND STIGMATIZATION OF THOSE PRACTICING RELIGION IN PUBLIC.** When asked about the causes and prevalence of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, local stakeholders have identified first and foremost unemployment, poverty and lack of social welfare support as the predominant reasons why over 300 Kosovo citizens have travelled to and joined foreign conflicts in Syria and Iraq after 2014. The presence of corruption and inefficient governance of Kosovo authorities has also played an important role in encouraging radical social and religious behaviour. Following this, local stakeholders have identified the presence of non-traditional religious groups who have promoted radical versions of Islam in informal and private mosques and in internet and social media as major sources of spreading misinformation which have misguided those who have travelled abroad to join different warring factions in Syria and Iraq. The third and final reason concerns the increased intolerance to difference that have occurred in Kosovo during the transitional period for the society. Namely, the increased intolerance to practicing religion has created enclosed and radicalized groups that have been separated from society. Local representatives of the Islamic community have argued that it is not only economic conditions or religious indoctrination that has pushed a number of Kosovo citizens to join radical Islamic groups, but also the societal intolerance to preaching and practicing non-traditional versions of Islam have played an important role which is often overlooked.

**LOW PREVALENCE OF RADICALIZATION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL AND THE LACK OF RESOURCES AND CAPACITIES HAS PUSHED THE MUNICIPAL MECHANISMS TO TAKE A REACTIVE APPROACH TO ADDRESSING THIS PHENOMENON.** Although municipal mechanisms, such as the Municipal Council for Safety in Community, are set in place to tackle various community insecurities, including radicalization, they have a limited role and

capacity in addressing radicalization at the local level. This notwithstanding, there is general awareness among local stakeholders about the push and pull factors of radicalism, but due to low prevalence of radicalism they have adopted a reactive approach to the phenomenon, namely responding to and referring cases if they arise. Municipal mechanisms however seem to lack strategic guidance on addressing the sources and drivers of radicalization. At best, they serve as referral and intermediary bodies between central government and affected communities.

**MOST APPROPRIATE STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS RADICALIZATION IS COMBINATION OF PREVENTIVE EDUCATION AND REACTIVE SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF THOSE AFFECTED AND RETURNING FROM FOREIGN CONFLICT ZONES.** A combination of formal and informal education is considered as most appropriate method for preventing and responding to religious radicalization. Among local stakeholders, including police, there is a preference for restorative justice and social reintegration of foreign fighters and their families, as opposed to punitive and exclusionary measures.

In sum, the risk of religious radicalization is currently considered low among local stakeholders in Kosovo. Yet, while religious radicalization is no longer a security threat to Kosovo, there is a pressing need to expand the conceptual scope of security threats and plan for preventing and countering new emerging forms of religious, ideological and ethnic radicalization. Moreover, any policy and institutional response to emerging threats needs to ensure a more integrated approach among central and municipal authorities as well as a whole of society approach which tackles causes, triggers, and consequences of any form of potential radicalization and endangerment to the democratic values and human rights of Kosovo citizens. This study is organized in two parts. The first part provides an overview of changing nature of security threats in Kosovo and provides a contextual analysis of the origins, manifestation, and responses to religious radicalization in the country. The second part presents the results of semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders in Kosovo, highlighting key features and patterns of local perceptions and responses to religious radicalization.

## The changing nature of security challenges in Kosovo

Societies affected by violent conflict and fragility - in addition to their association with perpetual crises caused by ethnic tensions, weak governance, and poverty as well as underdevelopment - are now widely associated with violent extremism.<sup>1</sup> Global trends show that fragile states provide volatile conditions for transnational and non-state actors and insurgencies to engage in political violence, radicalization and terrorist activities.<sup>2</sup> However, it has become clear that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures undertaken by states and international alliances tend to only tackle the immediate threats. While many terrorist networks around the world have been neutralized and dismantled, they often fall short in addressing the underlying conditions, triggers, and embedded push and pull factors that enable violent extremism and political violence. Radicalization and violent extremism have gradually replaced notions such as terrorism to capture a broad range of actual and potential threats to what are deemed as normal and acceptable norms and rules governing states and societies. Thus, radicalization has come to signify ideological, religious, and political beliefs and aspirations that are in opposition to moderate and normal values and norms. In more practical sense, radicalization tend to be invoked broadly as a term to refer to the complex set of threats and radical challenges to basic

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<sup>1</sup> See: US Institute of Peace, 'Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach: Final Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States', 2019. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach>.

<sup>2</sup> UK Stabilization Unit, 'Countering Violent Extremism in Fragile and Conflict Affected States', 2018. Available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/766399/20160701\\_SU\\_Report\\_CVE\\_in\\_FCAS\\_O.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766399/20160701_SU_Report_CVE_in_FCAS_O.pdf)



democratic values, norms, and institutions.<sup>3</sup> Violent extremism is the process when radical thoughts are materialized into violent and harmful conduct, which can be expressed in individual or large-scale terrorising acts. Across the world, countries and international organizations have mobilized police, military, intelligence, and courts in prosecuting actual and potential radicalization suspects. At the societal level, measures to prevent the rise of violent extremisms have focused on educational, media outreach, and psychosocial interventions. In a broader sense, there is greater realization that radicalization is a manifestation of long-term neglect of socio-economic inequality, bad governance, and often related to the legacies of past wars and insecurities, including years of marginalization of groups based on their religious or ethnic identity.

In the Western Balkans, the efforts of international community to stabilize the societies that have emerged from the violent conflicts have shifted the focus from inter-ethnic tensions and political violence to dealing with radicalization and different modes of violent and non-violent extremism, including the challenges arising from global foreign fighter phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> The shift of security concerns in the Western Balkans from ethnic tensions to religious violent extremism has come in response of growing radicalization among the Muslim communities in the region which is related to the decade-long work of overt and covert operations of Middle Eastern and Arab religious organizations and charity groups in impoverished regions of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina where both international missions and national government have been unable to address their socio-economic needs and tackle the religious indoctrination. In particular, extensive attention and intervention has taken place in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to tackle the problem of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq between 2011 and 2016. Yet, no such attention is given to the foreign fighters from Serbia and Bosnia who went to Ukraine in support of Russian-backed hybrid war have been widely overlooked. It is considered that

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission, 'A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect' Brussels 2020. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/pdf/09122020\\_communication\\_commission\\_european\\_parliament\\_the\\_council\\_eu\\_agenda\\_counter\\_terrorism\\_po-2020-9031\\_com-2020\\_795\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/pdf/09122020_communication_commission_european_parliament_the_council_eu_agenda_counter_terrorism_po-2020-9031_com-2020_795_en.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> See: Shpend Kursani, Literature Review 2017-2018, Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans (2019), Extremism Research Forum, 2019. Available at: <https://www.rcc.int/swp/docs/277/extremism-research-forum-literature-review-2017-2018-violent-extremism-in-the-western-balkans-2019rn>



around 300 Serbian citizens travelled to Ukraine's conflict zones to support Russian backed military and paramilitary groups.<sup>5</sup>

After 2014, Kosovo was once again put into spotlight by the international community as a result of growing concerns about the rise of certain segments of radical Islam within society. Kosovo constitutionally is a secular state, and the ideological and political orientation of the Government of Kosovo is pro-Western, most of the Kosovo Albanian population are moderate Muslims. According to the 2011 Kosovo census, Kosovo Albanians constitute a majority with roughly 86.63% of total population or 1,623,419 inhabitants. The majority of them belong to Sunni Muslim religion, while 2.37% or 38,438 are Catholic. Prior to 1999, Kosovo was dominated by a moderate Islam, based on the Hanafi school, and the Muslim community was characterized by a high level of inter-religious tolerance. After the international intervention and the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999, a number of international charities (whether Western or Eastern) provided Kosovo with humanitarian assistance and helped reconstructed the country. While western states have channelled their interests through institutional routes and open support for pro-western civil society groups, Gulf countries, mostly, have used alternative approaches by supporting rural impoverished Muslim communities in Kosovo and leveraging humanitarian relief in exchange of accepting non-traditional versions of Islam.<sup>6</sup> In particular, a number of organizations from the Gulf countries exploited the socio-economic vulnerabilities of local communities in Kosovo, especially in the rural and remote regions, to indoctrinate young people and women with a more assertive and radical version of Islam which ran against the traditional religious practices in Kosovo as well as inter-ethnic tolerance. The hidden intention behind such humanitarian aid was to "control the population's spiritual life, to politicize Islam and to encourage intolerance towards secularism and religious plurality in Kosovo".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See: Maja Zivanovic, 'Donbass Brothers: How Serbian Fighters Were Deployed in Ukraine', BIRN 2018. Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/13/donbass-brothers-how-serbian-fighters-were-deployed-in-ukraine-12-12-2018/>.

<sup>6</sup> Gëzim Visoka 'Kosovo: Between Western and Non-Western States', in Florian Bieber and Nikolaos Tzifakis (eds), *The Western Balkans in the World: Linkages and Relations with External Actors*. London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 108-125.

<sup>7</sup> KIPRED (Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development), 2016. 'What Happened to Kosovo Albanians: The Impact of Religion on the Ethnic Identity in the Statebuilding period', Policy Paper, No. 1/16, p. 40. Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development. Available from:

Since then, the Government of Kosovo has openly admitted that “the spread of the phenomenon of violent extremism and radicalism in the Republic of Kosovo was done by some NGO, local and foreign organizations and individuals that have embraced the radical views.”<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the U.S. 2016 Country Report on Terrorism considers that “the threat of violent Islamist extremism has been growing in Kosovo, assisted in part by funding from foreign organizations that preach extremist ideologies and violent extremist groups actively using social media to spread propaganda and recruit followers”.<sup>9</sup> For over a decade, radical Islam was not an issue in Kosovo, but the matter gained international and national traction when 403 Kosovars joined the call for resisting Assad regime in Syria and Iraq, among them it is estimated that 255 were men, while the rest were women and children who wilfully and in some cases forcefully accompanying their partners who were foreign fighters.<sup>10</sup> According to official data, until the end of 2020, 135 foreign fighters have returned to Kosovo.<sup>11</sup> It is estimated that 75 Kosovo citizens are killed in the conflict zones of Syria. Recent figures show that out of 225 foreign fighters, “48 individuals or 20 % of Kosovo’s total foreign fighters are young individuals who have no relations to Kosovo or are born in another country”.<sup>12</sup> It is estimated that the low number of Kosovo citizens participating in foreign wars is a result of Kosovo police and security institutions in counter-terrorism, tightening border control, and enhancing cooperation with regional and international security structures.

To prevent and counter violent extremism, the Government of Kosovo has taken a wide range of punitive and restorative measures. The Government of Kosovo has joined its Western allies and jointed the Global Coalition against

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[http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/What\\_happened\\_to\\_Kosovo\\_Albanians\\_740443.pdf](http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/What_happened_to_Kosovo_Albanians_740443.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Government of Kosovo, *Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism (2015-2020)*, p. 10. Available from: [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY\\_parandalim\\_-\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> US Department of State. *Country Report on Terrorism 2016*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2017, p. 135.

<sup>10</sup> International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, ‘What EU Member States can learn from Kosovo’s experience in repatriating former foreign fighters and their families’, May 2020. Available at: [https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Policy\\_Brief\\_Kosovo\\_experience\\_repatriating\\_former\\_foreign\\_fighters\\_May\\_2020.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Policy_Brief_Kosovo_experience_repatriating_former_foreign_fighters_May_2020.pdf) p. 2

<sup>11</sup> KCSS, “Beyond the Triggers; New Threats of Violent Extremism in Kosovo”, 2018, p.8-10. Available at: [http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/violent-extremism-eng\\_611603.pdf](http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/violent-extremism-eng_611603.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

ISIS (Daesh) in the fight against terrorism and has adopted a solid legal framework that addresses the problem of terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism. In 2015, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the Law on Prohibition of Joining the Armed Conflict outside State Territory of the Republic of Kosovo, which aims to protect the state interests and national security. According to this law, anyone who organizes, recruits, trains or leads persons or groups participating in armed conflicts outside the territory of Kosovo may be punished by imprisonment of 5 to 15 years, while combatants participating in foreign wars may be punished by 3 to 15 years. In 2015, the Government of Kosovo has approved 'The Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism'. This policy document aimed that state institutions, together with civil society organizations, media and religious organizations in Kosovo, take measures to raise awareness through lectures in schools, design media campaigns on the consequences of violent extremism and provide an alternative narrative to the one presented by the protagonists of the Islamic State.<sup>13</sup> Three years later, in 2018, Kosovo approved the State Strategy against Terrorism and Action Plan and according to this document, the terrorist fighters who have taken part in foreign wars are considered a threat to the secular and democratic character of Kosovo's institutions. Also, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo has appointed a National Coordinator to oversee and implement this legal and strategic anti-terror framework. In 2019, Kosovo amended the Criminal Code which covers terrorism financing and identity fraud and travel in foreign wars and engagement in terrorist activities.

To implement these policy measures, Kosovo has set up both national and local mechanisms (see Table 1 below). The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo has established within the Department for Public Safety, the Division for Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalized Persons, whose role is to reintegrate persons who have returned from foreign conflict zones. As indicated in a study conducted by Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, "Kosovo's Correctional System with the assistance of the US government has developed special programs that seek to support their rehabilitation and disengagement from radical religious beliefs. These include skills development

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<sup>13</sup> KCSS, "The Islamic State Narrative in Kosovo: Deconstructed One Story at a Time", 2017, p.18-19. Available at: [http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/ISNinKosovo-eng\\_794656.pdf](http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/ISNinKosovo-eng_794656.pdf)

courses and other trainings".<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, fearing re-radicalization or radicalization of others within Kosovo prisons, the Ministry of Justice has signed an MoU with the Islamic Community of Kosovo and the latter was about to offer lectures on deradicalization for former foreign fighters. However, since the Imams who were supposed to conduct those deradicalization session with imprisoned foreign fighters had to go through security clearance by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, this has allegedly undermined the trust and cooperation between Kosovo security institutions and the Islamic Community of Kosovo. Even though security institutions in Kosovo enjoy wide public support, public attitudes on the work of state institutions in countering violent extremism remains widely negative.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 1: Institutional Responsibilities for Preventing Radicalization in Kosovo**

<b><i>Institution/body</i></b>	<b><i>Responsibilities</i></b>
<i>Ministry of Internal Affairs</i>	<p>Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) through its mechanisms supports the safeguarding of confidential information and undertakes activities in the field of prevention, security and other activities related to violent radicalism and terrorism.</p> <p><u>Division for the Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalized Persons (DPRRP):</u> The current Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism (2015-2020) promoted the creation of DPRRP as a so-called 'soft' mechanism that deals with issues of violent extremism and coordinates inter-institutional efforts to support prevention and reintegration activities. Among others, DPRRP is tasked with:</p> <p>Inter-sectorial coordination of reintegration activities for radicalized persons. DPRRP coordinates efforts across sectors such as, Social Welfare (Ministry of Labor and Social</p>

<sup>14</sup> KCSS, 'Unpacking Kosovo's response to returnees from the war zones in Syria and Iraq', 2020, p.36.

<sup>15</sup> UNDP Kosovo, Public Pulse Analysis on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo, Prishtina, 2017, p. 9. Available at: [https://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library/democratic\\_governance/public-pulse-analysis-on-prevention-of-violent-extremism-in-koso.html](https://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-pulse-analysis-on-prevention-of-violent-extremism-in-koso.html)

	<p>Welfare), Security (MIA), Kosovo Police, Kosovo Agency for Public Security, Justice (Ministry of Justice), etc;                  Design and implementation of activities at the level of communities in support of reintegration processes;                  Monitoring of local cases; and                  Analysis and evaluation of prevention activities with the aim of providing early warning for relevant mechanisms<sup>16</sup>.</p>
<i>National Coordinator against Terrorism</i>	<p>The national coordinator against terrorism has an executive role held by the MIA, who is responsible for the coordination, monitoring and reporting on the overall policy framework and its implementation related to violent extremism and terrorism.</p>
<i>Line Ministries</i>	<p><u>Ministry of Justice:</u> Coordinates activities with all ministries, agencies and religious communities who are related to the process of de-radicalization and re-socialization of convicts.</p> <p><u>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology:</u> Assists in the area of prevention and awareness through curriculum development and organization of awareness activities in the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism.</p> <p><u>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports:</u> Develops programs for raising level of cultural communication and coexistence between cultures of all ethnic, religious or linguistic communities in the country.</p> <p><u>Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare:</u> Provides support schemes and social-integration policies for reintegrated persons.</p>
<i>Kosovo Police</i>	<p>As a law enforcement agency within MIA, Kosovo Police (KP) has the principal responsibility in combating terrorism through its Department against Terrorism and other support structures under the Kosovo Police</p>
<i>Municipalities</i>	<p>At the local level, DPRRP works closely in coordinating prevention and reintegration processes both with Municipalities and Municipal Councils for Safety in Community.</p> <p><u>Municipal Council for Safety in Community (MCSC):</u> MCSCs are a high-level municipal council composed of Mayors of</p>

<sup>16</sup> Draft Regulation on the Internal Organization and Systematization of Jobs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

	Municipalities and security personnel who are tasked with providing, analyzing and discussing security issues in municipalities. In relation to prevention processes, MSCs are crucial in providing relevant information on early warnings and targeting interventions in their relevant communities related to both prevention and reintegration.
<i>Correctional Service</i>	The Kosovo Correctional Service (in cooperation with other relevant justice institutions) plays an important role in correcting and re-socializing persons convicted for criminal activities
<i>Probation Service</i>	The Kosovo Probation Service responsible for the execution of alternative measures and penalties, supervision, resocialization, reintegration and rehabilitation of all persons who have committed punishable offenses under the applicable laws

Undoubtedly, the policy and institutional measures taken by the Government of Kosovo to tackle and prevent religious radicalization is a demonstration of Kosovo's ability to respond to emerging threats as well as serve as a reliable partner to the international coalition of states engaged in combating transnational violent extremism. However, an IOM commissioned report which evaluated the 'National Strategy on on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism (2015-2020)' recently found that too much emphasis has been put on the capacity building of central institutions but insufficient investment is made in strengthening local authorities capacities and awareness for responding to radicalisation.<sup>17</sup> Although there has been a clear strategic shift from preventative measures to added emphasis on reintegration and rehabilitation, linking central government efforts with local front liners remains crucial for developing a comprehensive institutional response to any form of radicalization.

As it is, the inter-institutional mechanisms that DPRRP is supposed to coordinate are not yet formalized. Ad-hoc responses and activities continue to be implemented at the level of targeted municipalities, regardless of the support of international donors and local CSOs have provided to broaden and formalize the cooperation between DPRRP and municipal stakeholders. Considering this, it is crucial to assess how local stakeholders across Kosovo

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<sup>17</sup> International Organization on Migration (IOM). 2019. "Evaluation of the Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that leads to Terrorism (2015-2020)".

perceive the problem of radicalization at the communal level as well as the functionality of various mechanisms and strategies put in place to prevent and address religious radicalization. The same IOM report found that one of the main gaps identified in the strategy was “the [lack] of inclusion of local authorities in [its] drafting”.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, while the majority of specific objectives detailed out in the action plan have targeted specific municipalities, respective planning on them did not include relevant municipal authorities. The lack of inclusion in the drafting of the strategy has in turn resulted in increased ambiguity among local actors on their role in devising their institutional responses to prevention and reintegration of those affected by religious radicalization.

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<sup>18</sup> International Organization on Migration (IOM). 2019. “Evaluation of the Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that leads to Terrorism (2015-2020)”.



## Mapping local perspectives on religious radicalization in Kosovo

### The temporal and emplaced meaning of insecurities

The threat of religious radicalization has recently been the focus of numerous studies and public opinion polls in Kosovo. At the national level, opinion polls conducted at the peak period (2015-2018) when the issue of radicalization was treated as a problem in Kosovo, show that among Kosovo citizens there was still a widespread perception that religious radicalization poses a threat to their lives. For instance, public opinion surveys conducted by local civil society organizations in Kosovo showed that in 2017, 74 percent of citizens considered violent extremism a threat, while the 2018 marked a slightly lower perception at 70 percent.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, research conducted by UNDP Kosovo in 2017 showed that among the general public “the decreased number of people who join extremist groups in the Middle East is not an indicator of the decreasing level of threat”.<sup>20</sup> However, since the political attention in Kosovo has moved to other challenges and strong measures countering religious radicalization were taken by Kosovar authorities, the perception of insecurities also changed among Kosovo citizens. For example, the 2020 Kosovo Security Barometer found that “unemployment, corruption, Serbia, organized crime, partition of Kosovo, petty crime, and youth flight[migration]”, are the main threats to Kosovo society.<sup>21</sup> These trends demonstrates that the public perception of security threats tend to constantly evolve and it largely corresponds to the public framing of insecurities and emergencies by political actors, media,

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<sup>19</sup> KCSS, 'Citizens Perceptions on New Threats of Violent Extremism in Kosovo', 2019.

<sup>20</sup> UNDP Kosovo, 'Public Pulse Analysis on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo', Prishtina, 2017, p. 5.

<sup>21</sup> KCSS, 'Kosovo Security Barometer: Challenges of Public Safety in Kosovo', 2020, p.7

international organizations, and other stakeholders, such as civil society and interest groups.

Thus, understanding what constitutes a security threat at the local level provides important insights on what measures are taken to tackle such threats. One of the main questions discussed with local stakeholders has been their perception of local sources of insecurity. Namely, what do they consider a major threat to the security of local population in their municipality. In over 30 municipalities of Kosovo, violent extremism and radicalization is not considered a significant source of local insecurity. There is an awareness that radicalization can lead to violent behaviour which can undermine security, but that is more of a realization of a potential rather than actual threat to the everyday peace in Kosovo. There is also acknowledgement that in the past years there have been concerns related to violent extremism arising from the travel of Kosovo citizens to foreign wars and their subsequent return, but they are no longer defined as local source of insecurity. Worth noting, since the discourse of radicalisation and violent extremism is closely associated with radical Islam and those who have travelled to fight in Syria and Iraq, most of the respondents were unable to identify ethnic or ideological forms of political violence as alternative examples and manifestation of potential violent extremism. In other words, the narrow definition of violent extremism tends to overshadow other forms of insecurities which may be more prevalent threats to local security in Kosovo.

What we have found instead is that the nature of local insecurities in Kosovo are emplaced insecurities, meaning phenomena that are specific to different municipalities of Kosovo. Majority of sources of insecurity concerns personal and community safety, such as: domestic violence, theft and ordinary crimes, abuse with narcotics, environmental degradation, and job insecurity. These sources are both of everyday and structural nature. They are shaped by the communal context but also national developments. A snapshot of what constitutes a local threat in some of the municipalities of Kosovo shows how diverse and localized are the perceptions of insecurity across Kosovo. In small municipalities, such as Kaçanik/Kaçanik, Vitia/Vitina, and Hani i Elezit/Elez Han, where most of those who travelled to Syria, unemployment and socio-economic underdevelopment are listed as major sources of local insecurity. In other regions, such as Decan/Dečane and Skenderaj/Srbica, domestic violence and prevalence of patriarchy are listed as main source of local insecurity. In Drenas/Glogovac and Istog/Istok, unemployment, theft, youth

violence and abuse with narcotics are listed as major sources of insecurity.<sup>22</sup> In Kamenicë/Kamenica, farming and livestock left in rural zones is considered major concern for the local community.<sup>23</sup> In Podujevë/Podujevo, presence of small illegal arms is considered as major threat to local safety.<sup>24</sup> In Rahovec/Orahovac, the lack of street lighting and theft are considered major sources of insecurity. In Prishtinë/Priština, air pollution and traffic related accidents are listed as major source of concern. Similarly, in Obiliç/Obilić, which hosts Kosovo's coal power plants, air pollution is seen as the main source of local insecurity.<sup>25</sup> In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, congested road traffic and burglary are considered main sources of local insecurity.<sup>26</sup> Finally, in Lipjan/Lipljane, stray dogs and gender-based street insecurity are considered as immediate local security concerns.<sup>27</sup>

Contrary to general perceptions on ethnic division in Kosovo<sup>28</sup>, our research shows that the everyday meaning of insecurity remains similar across different ethnic groups. Respondents in Serb populated municipalities, have similarly confirmed that there are no religion-based violence or inter-ethnic extremism. For example, in Gracanica/Gračanica, poverty and lack of jobs for young people are considered main sources of insecurity. As a member of Municipal Assembly in Gracanica/Gračanica stated:

*"The situation was peaceful for several years, and I haven't noticed extremism in my municipality. For now, there are no signs that violent extremism will arise in our municipality. I just hope that the peace will last in the future. I think that nobody wants to see the violence that we have experienced in the 1990's."*<sup>29</sup>

The same factor has been highlighted as a driving force towards ethnic, socio-economic and religious radicalization, violent and non-violent extremism.<sup>30</sup> The

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Drenas, 23 February 2021.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Kamenica, 23 February 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Podujevo, 18 February 2021.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Obilic, 23 February 2021.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Fushe Kosove, 19 February 2021.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council of Safety in Community, Lipjan. 16 February 2021.

<sup>28</sup> Sartori, A. 2006. A Grassroots Way to Go: Albanian and Serb Inter-Community Relations in Kosovo from CSO's Perspective. Available at: <http://www.ngoaktiv.org/uploads/files/English.pdf>.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Gracanica, 9 March 2021.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Gracanica, 9 March 2021.

municipality of Mamusha/Mamuša is considered peaceful and free from the impacts of extremism or radicalism. Minor thefts, public disturbances created by young students, lack of law and order are considered as major sources of insecurity for the municipality of Mamusha/Mamuša.<sup>31</sup> However, in fewer instances, such as south and north Mitrovica/Severna Mitrovica, ethnic and migrant related incidents are considered as threats to local peace and security. In Dragash/Dragaš, the presence of Serb parallel structures is listed as major source of local insecurity.<sup>32</sup> In Mitrovica South the division of the city along ethnic lines together with drug abuse, theft, and the presence of migrants are listed as major sources of local insecurity. <sup>33</sup> In Deçan/Dečane, local stakeholders have stated that religious extremism is not present in the community, but for them there is a risk of ethnic extremism coming from controversies surrounding the property of the Deçan/Dečani Monastery. <sup>34</sup>

What these findings show is that despite extensive attention and precautionary measures taken, the phenomenon of religious radicalization is not considered a real security threat for local stakeholders in Kosovo. Instead, a broad range of everyday and emplaced concerns seems to constitute the primary threats to local security. These findings notwithstanding, local stakeholders do not underestimate the potential threat that can come religious, ethnic ideological radicalization, and its potential translation into violent conduct. However, their pressing concerns are local socio-economic needs, improvement of local governance, and investment on human security, which can in the long run play an important role in tackling temporal and episodic threats such as those of radicalization and violent extremism.

## Causes and prevalence of violent extremism at the local level

A significant number of empirical studies conducted by research think-tanks in Kosovo have focused on exploring the causes and prevalence of radicalization and violent extremism. They have mostly been public opinion

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Mamushe, 2 March 2021

<sup>32</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Mitrovica south, 15 February 2021. In the recent years, Kosovo as the rest of the Western Balkans became a new transition route to the EU for refugees and economic migrants, mostly coming from Asia and other conflict-affected zones. While most of these cases are handled by

<sup>34</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Decan, 24 February 2021.

polls and comparative and in-depth analysis of local communities where most of foreign fights from Kosovo have come from. While our findings are broadly on the same line with previous research, we provide some interesting nuances on the causes, push and pull factors, and prevalence of radicalism at the local level which enhances our knowledge of the changing perception of insecurities in the country. As part of this research, we have asked local police representatives from local police, members of Council for Safety in Community, and members from the Municipality Assembly to rank how prevalent is religious radicalization in their municipality and what level of priority should be given to it (1 being major problem and 10 not a problem). Across Kosovo, local security stakeholders have stated that radicalization is not considered as the most significant threat to local security (see Table 2 below). In other words, religion-based radicalism is identified as a temporary threat which is no longer prevalent in Kosovo. For example, 27 members of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, who have responded to this question, have stated that moderate attention should be given to radicalization and violent extremism (score 5 out of 10). 27 local representatives of Kosovo Police who have responded to this question have considered radicalization as a non-significant threat to local security (score 7 out of 10). Similarly, 25 members of Municipal Assembly, who have responded to this question, have stated that the phenomenon is not a pressing issue at the local level in Kosovo (score 6 out of 10).

**Table 2: Religious radicalization as a problem in Kosovo**

<i>Local stakeholder</i>	<i>Score*</i>	<i>Sample</i>
<i>Municipal Council for Safety in Community</i>	5	27
<i>Kosovo Police</i>	7	27
<i>Municipal Assembly Councilor</i>	6	25

*\* 1 = serious problem; 10 = not a problem*

This general finding notwithstanding, local stakeholders were also asked if they can identify some of the key underlining factors which you think have or can trigger, ethnic, socio-economic, and religious radicalization, violent and non-

violent extremism in their municipality. Majority of respondents have identified three major factors which can cause radicalization in the local communities:

- **Unemployment, economic injustice, and corruption;**
- **Misinformation and inappropriate religious indoctrination; and**
- **Signalization and marginalization of those practicing non-traditional Islam.**

Across all local stakeholders and municipalities, the main reason which may push people to engage in radical social and political behaviour is structural inequality manifested in the form of poverty, economic underdevelopment and lack of employment opportunities. Kosovo's population is youngest in Europe and the country has one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe.<sup>35</sup> This forms a significant economic insecurity and can be translated into other security challenges. For example, it is estimated that Kosovo in the first decade of independent statehood, around 10% of its population have left the country. Only between 2014 and 2015, over 100,000 Kosovo citizens left the country, ranking Kosovo as one of the highest asylum seekers in the European Union. Our interviews with local stakeholders show that they believe socio-economic grievances have contributed to the spread of religious extremism in Kosovo. A police office in Kaçanik stated that the main factors pushing young people towards radicalization are the social problems and lack of education:

*"I have been in this position for 10 years and I have worked with the directorate against extremism, we have done analysis and identification of persons and we have seen that most of the supporters of radicalism and religious extremism have had social problems and their level of education has been low."*

Another respondent from Lipjan/Lipljane added:

*"Lack of perspective for young people, poor education system, and lack of institutional support are major sources of insecurity and underlying leading to radicalism and extremism".<sup>36</sup>*

Similarly, a local councillor in Suharekë/Suva Reka maintained that since there are "many unemployed people they can easily be indoctrinated."<sup>37</sup> For representatives of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, political and economic

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<sup>35</sup> Kosovo Agency of Statistics "Labor Force Survey Q2 2018", September, 2018. Available at: <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/4416/labour-force-survey-q2-2018.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Lipjan, 16 February 2021.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Suhareke, 18 February 2021.

instability, poverty and unemployment can be some of the factors that can cause radicalization.<sup>38</sup> A member of the municipal council for safety in the community in Kaçanik/Kaçanik added that “the main factors are closely related to the problem of unemployment, the education system”.<sup>39</sup>

These local perspectives complement existing research which have similarly found that socio-economic and political factors at home have played a far more important role than religious motivations for travelling abroad to joining foreign conflicts. Research drawing on socio-economic indicators shows that the causes of violent extremism in Kosovo are related to the country's poor economy, lack of perspective, unreformed educational system, identity issues, and the isolation and exclusion of Kosovo from freedom of movement in Europe.<sup>40</sup> In particular, existing research shows that “the growing religious conservatism is especially visible in rural areas where unemployment is high”, whereby “Islamic charities are filling the gap left by Kosovo's weak institutions”.<sup>41</sup> Research on the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo shows that those individuals that travelled to Iraq and Syria and joined different warring factions there come from impoverished and neglected regions of Kosovo by both international missions, donors, as well as national and local authorities.<sup>42</sup> The failure to meet people's socio-economic rights and provide a sense of security and good governance has pushed individuals to radicalize and join radical religious groups that offer them a sense of belonging and inclusion. Most of the returnees have testified that they were disillusioned by those who have recruited them and most of them have regretted their involvement in foreign conflicts and have served prison or engaged in reintegration programmes.

Along with socio-economic injustice, local stakeholders have highlighted that factors related to poor governance, corruption and insufficient institutional support for vulnerable communities has indirectly encouraged radicalization. Since corruption remains widespread in Kosovo that contributes to the public

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Kaçanik

<sup>40</sup> See: UNDP Kosovo, Public Pulse Analysis on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo, p. 7.

<sup>41</sup> BTI 2018 “Country Report: Kosovo”, p.10. Available at: [https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI\\_2018\\_Kosovo.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI_2018_Kosovo.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> Adrian Shtuni, ‘Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 397, 2016.



view that elected officeholders and civil servants operate with impunity."<sup>43</sup> As Kosovo's institutions and international missions in Kosovo have fallen short of constructing a fair democratic political system, an efficient economy that addresses the problem of unemployment and a system of education built upon Western values, there has been a large social vacuum that is being filled with another narrative, namely that of the so-called Islamic State. According to the narrative of Islamic radical groups, Kosovo is governed by a non-believing political elite who serves in the interest of the West and whose aim is to fight against Islam in Kosovo.<sup>44</sup> In addition, this narrative was constructed through social media and Internet propaganda glorifying the conflict in Syria as a holy war and every Muslim is obligated to part take. To spread this simplified narrative, social media, especially, Facebook, You Tube, Telegram has played a significant role. A study by Kosovo Center for Security Studies shows that "challenges such as corruption, organized crime, poor education and health systems, lack of rule of law and poor governance have created an environment of hopelessness for better life in the country and have increased the level of the community's vulnerability to extremism and radicalism in the country".<sup>45</sup> Another study conducted by International Republican Institute in 2017 on the local drivers of violent extremism in four municipalities of Kosovo with the largest number of participants in foreign wars (Prishtina/Priština, Ferizaj/Uroševac, Hani i Elezit/Elez Han and Kaçanik/Kaçanik) found corruption is perceived as the main driver of violent extremism in Kosovo. In particular, the study found that "unemployment, the lack of responsiveness by local government and the perception of widespread corruption appear to deprive vulnerable segments of Kosovo's population of their sense of agency and self-worth."<sup>46</sup>

The second reason that local stakeholders have identified as a source of radicalization concerns the misinformation and inappropriate religious education promoted by informal preachers and foreign religious

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<sup>43</sup> BTI 2020 Country Report: Kosovo. Available at: [https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country\\_report\\_2020\\_RKS.pdf](https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_RKS.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> KCSS, "The Islamic State Narrative in Kosovo: Deconstructed One Story at a Time", September 2017.

<sup>45</sup> KCSS, 'Kosova Resilience Index - Violent Extremism in Kosova: What community resilience can teach us? 2020, p. 8. Available from: <http://www.qkss.org/en/Reports/Kosova-Resilience-Index-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosova-What-community-resilience-can-teach-us-1363>.

<sup>46</sup> International Republican Institute, 'Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Kosovo', 2017, p.5

organizations, which take place in private settings and social media.<sup>47</sup> Those who have been recruited as foreign fighters in the Middle Eastern conflicts in Syria and Iraq have confessed that narratives “the post-war society grapples with forging an identity, past grievances pertaining to the 1998-1999 war such as wartime rape and the perceived bias against Muslims” have played a major role in pushing them to join foreign conflicts.<sup>48</sup> For example, in Hani i Elezit/Elez Han, misinformation is considered as a driving force towards religious radicalization, violent and non-violent extremism.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, the presence of two parallel mosques in the municipality of Deçan/Dečane which preach slightly different aspects of Islam is perceived as a potential security threat in the municipality.<sup>50</sup> Of the same view, are the local safety council in Istog/Istok who consider misinformation through social networks, internet and lessons held in mosques which are not properly and adequately controlled as factors that push young people to extremist actions.<sup>51</sup> In Gjakova/Djakovica, representatives from the Islamic Community of Kosovo admitted that “communication in small joint groups, especially on Facebook, exist and they do not consult with the imams of the Islamic Community but have their own worldviews. These groups do not indicate any danger in the municipality, but they exist as a potential for extremism in the future.”<sup>52</sup> A police officer in Dragash/Dragaš stated that: “The factors that push youngsters towards radicalism may be certain unofficial religious leaders. I would think that preaching held by certain Imams often trigger extremist views.”

The prevalence of religious misinformation and radical narratives of Islam is mainly attributed to the weak education system and neglect by public institutions to address the problem of competing and conflicting religious narratives and practices among the socially disadvantaged regions and communities of Kosovo. In the small town of Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, unemployment and unreliable sources of information are considered as

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<sup>47</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Fushe Kosove, 19 February 2021; Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

<sup>48</sup> KCSS, *The Islamic State Narrative in Kosovo: Deconstructed One Story At a Time*, 2017, p. 6 Available at: [http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/ISNinKosovo-eng\\_794656.pdf](http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/ISNinKosovo-eng_794656.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Hani i Elezit. 25 February 2021.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Istog, 16 February 2021.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Gjakova, 25 February 2021.

underlying factors leading to ethnic, socio-economic and religious radicalism, violent and non-violent extremism.<sup>53</sup> From the perspective of local police officers in Kosovo, social media and propaganda used by radical groups to influence youth, economic aspects, unemployment and low education are some of the main factors that push young people towards radicalization and violent extremism. According to a local representative of Kosovo Police in Prizren, the main factors that influence ethnic, socio-economic, religious radicalism as well as violent and non-violent extremism are lack of information, misinformation, and manipulation by unauthorized lecturers through online platforms.<sup>54</sup>

The third and final set of factors concerns social stigmatization of those who practice non-traditional versions of Islam. A number of local stakeholders have stated that an important reason why certain citizens are prone to joining such informal religious education and subterranean groups concerns social stigmatization, discrimination, and marginalization of those wanting to practice religion in Kosovo.<sup>55</sup> As a local councillor from Kaçanik/Kaçanik stated:

*“At the local level there is a strong sediment that there are religious prejudices, namely an anti-Islam perception which has played a role in the marginalization of those practicing and preaching this faith, and has pushed some of them to practice it in subterranean level”.*<sup>56</sup>

Similarly, a Kosovo police officer in Gjilan/Gnjilane identified the struggle of young people for defining their identity and lack of support by adults and other social institutions as main reason that could push them to join violent extremist groups.<sup>57</sup> Along the same lines, a representative of Islamic Community in Drenas/Glogovac, stated:

*“When people do not have a proper education based on multiculturalism and tolerance, when they feel left out of systems or even by different groups, when they are not valued enough by society, when they do not have a solid life and are in difficult economic*

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<sup>53</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Ovobërdë, 3 March 2021.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Prizren, 01 March 2021.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Drenas, 23 February 2021.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Kaçanik, 3 March 2021.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Gjilan, 19 February 2021.

*conditions, these are some of the reasons that push people towards extremist and radical thoughts and actions.”<sup>58</sup>*

Consequently, some of the local stakeholders have highlighted that an outcome of this stigmatization and social exclusion results in creation of enclosed communities of individuals who no longer share the same values and belief as the rest of the community. As a civil society representative from Dragash/Dragaš stated:

*“We have a group of people that practice their religion in mosques that were built illegally. They do not socialize much with our community, except the community that share common beliefs and/or ideology. They run their own businesses and get together in common spaces/ restaurant of their own. We do not have access to and none of us visit those places or attend to. We believe that these group of people have been sort of brainwashed by extremist form Arab countries, some say that they are also paid to spread the fundamental or better say the extremist ideology.”<sup>59</sup>*

These observations among local stakeholders highlight the broad variety of factors, mostly non-religious, which can contribute to radicalization. They also reveal how difficult it is to pin down the causes of radicalization as each case is unique and shaped by a combination of situational and structural factors. Though, the three categories of factors identified by local stakeholders are a reminder that only through a comprehensive and whole-of-society approach we can prevent and address radicalization which can lead to social unrest and terrorism. Yet, such a vast diversity of factors shows how difficult it is to devise policy interventions that are prone to preventing and tackling emerging security threats while preserving human rights and democratic institutions.

### Municipal mechanisms for preventing and responding to radicalization

While the central government in Kosovo has establishing policy and institutional mechanisms for tracking and responding to violent extremism, the extent to which such mechanisms are operational at the local level remains largely

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<sup>58</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Drenas, 23 February 2021.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

unexplored. As indicated earlier in this study, Kosovo has developed an institutional and policy architecture for combating violent extremism in the country. In particular, there is a range of central and local level institutions who are engaged in fulfilling the strategic objectives of the Strategy Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism (2015-2020). At the central level, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo works closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kosovo Police which have specially designated departments. Across all municipalities of Kosovo, councils for safety in the community along with the local police and municipal authorities are the key mechanisms designated to tackle violent extremism. These local safety councils bring together various local authority departments, schools, and religious communities.

Central to preventing and responding to radicalization remains the availability of municipal mechanisms and their interactions with community groups and outreach to vulnerable groups. Thus, stakeholders have been asked to comment on the contribution of municipal mechanisms in Kosovo for preventing and responding to radicalization. In general, local stakeholders have a mixed perception when it comes to the performance and impact of municipal mechanisms for responding to religious radicalization. In several municipalities where there have been none or only a handful number of cases where residents have attended foreign wars, it seems that local authorities have not taken active measures to prevent and tackle potential radicalization and violent extremism. Their approach has largely been reactive – attending and responding to requests that have come from the central government or international organizations and NGOs. Local stakeholders have highlighted that a significant number of municipalities has not considered as a priority the undertaking of preventive measures for the treatment of extremism and radicalism. A member of the council for safety in community in Drenas/Glogovac admitted:

*“The municipality has not taken any measures against radicalism because there have been no such phenomena. In cooperation with the Islamic Community, several lectures on violent extremism have been held in the municipality's schools and there are also regular meetings to discuss these issues”.<sup>60</sup>*

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<sup>60</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Drena, 23 February 2021.

In most of municipalities, local stakeholders have admitted that they do not have appropriate mechanisms for early detection of radicalism or for assisting the reintegration of those who have returned from foreign conflicts. As a member of municipal assembly of Drenas/Glogovac stated:

*"The municipality has not developed mechanisms for identifying early radicalism, however it is trying to implement those mechanisms that have been established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to combat extremism and radicalism".<sup>61</sup>*

Similarly, in Kamenicë/Kamenica, the municipality does not seem to possess specific mechanisms for detect early radicalization. It relies on the support of local police, intelligence agencies, and the community cooperation.<sup>62</sup> Expectedly, the only way to detect such cases is if family members or relatives inform the Police, the Center for Social Work or municipal authorities about the suspect behaviour.<sup>63</sup> In Deçan/ Dečane, a member of the council for safety in community admitted that the lack mechanisms for the integration of foreign fighters in the society. A shortage of psychosocial support was mentioned as one of the obstacles for tackling reintegration of foreign fighters into community.<sup>64</sup> On the other hand, civil society activists expressed their dissatisfaction with the work of municipal structures and argued that their role was limited due to lack of access to governmental and foreign donors' funds.<sup>65</sup>

Other municipalities appear to have been more active in responding to the fear of radicalization and violent extremism. The Municipality of Mitrovica South has drafted the "Municipal Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Action", which has been accepted by the central level and intends to serve as roadmap for guiding the local efforts for preventing and tackling radicalization at the local level.<sup>66</sup> However, actual implementation in practice of the Municipal Strategy

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<sup>61</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Drenas. 23 February 2021.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Kamenica, 23 February 2021.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Istog, 16 February 2021.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Deçan, 24 February 2021.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Gjakova, 25 February 2021.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Mitrovica south, 15 February 2021.



is entirely absent. In Pejë/Peć, the outlook is similarly positive, where the establishment of the municipal council for safety in community is considered one of the most important steps taken to battle radicalization. A municipal councillor highlighted that there are regular meetings with villages inhabited and religious institutions to monitor the situation on the ground and respond to the community concerns.<sup>67</sup> Though challenges were also reported. The municipality of Pejë/Peć apparently started a project with the support of OSCE to integrate foreign fighters, but it failed because there was no engagement among them.<sup>68</sup>

In Gjilan/Gnjilane, a member of the council for safety in community argued that their municipality “is well organized and works seriously on this issue” and that they have their “own mechanism for detecting radicalism”, adding that they contribute to de-radicalization through youth organizations and awareness-raising campaigns. A representative of Kosovo Police in Gjilan/Gnjilane confirmed that they have a referral system where key local municipal, security, religious, and education institutions share information about potential radicalization and engage in early detection and prevention.<sup>69</sup> In Ferizaj/Uroševac, in order to prevent religious extremism, it is reported that Kosovo Police cooperates closely with the Islamic Community of Kosovo, as well as with representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches.<sup>70</sup> In Rahovec/Orahovac, a municipal counsellor noted that:

*“The Community Safety Council together with the municipal mayor, the police and relevant institutions have taken all measures to combat these phenomena. The municipality has done an excellent job within its competencies and capacities to address this phenomenon”.*<sup>71</sup>

In some municipalities, such as Klinë/Klina, local police respondents have claimed that they have early detection mechanisms and also have mechanisms to preventing radicalization.<sup>72</sup> In Istog/Istok, a local police officer stated:

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<sup>67</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Peja, 22 February 2021.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Peja, 22 February 2021.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Gjilan, 19 February 2021.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Office, Ferizaj, 26 February 2021.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Rahovec, 1 March 2021.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Klinë, 26 February 2021.



*“We have regular meetings with the Municipal Committee for Community Safety. There we discuss cases which tend to be more radical, and we have regular communication with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has shown willingness to provide assistance, but also interested in receiving information from us to evaluate the general situation in our municipality.”<sup>73</sup>*

In Gracanica/Gračanica, municipal security structures are also seen as making a positive contribution. As a member of Municipal Assembly stated:

*“... I think that they are making good decisions, because the situation is fine for years. I haven't heard or noticed violent political or religious groups that could trigger violence on the streets.”<sup>74</sup>*

However, a handful number of members of the municipal councils for safety in community have criticized the central government for not including and envisaging a greater role for local authorities in the action plan for implementing the national strategy for countering violent extremism in Kosovo.<sup>75</sup> It seems that most of the municipalities lack local action plans and targeted strategies for implementing the central government's strategy for preventing violent extremism in Kosovo. For instance, a member of the Municipality of Kaçanik/Kaçanik, a small town where a large number of its local residents travelled to Syria and Iraq, blamed the local government for not working enough to address the radicalization.<sup>76</sup> However, in Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, members of the local assembly were dissatisfied with the efforts of the local authorities highlighting the lack of transparency and inefficiency of responsible bodies within the municipality presented serious challenges to tackling radicalism and extremism.<sup>77</sup> Similarly, lack of local action plans for the prevention of radicalization is considered as a major source of uncertainty for the Municipality of Prizren.<sup>78</sup> According to a representative of the Islamic Community in Prizren, they have no information about the efforts of local authorities to tackle religious radicalism.”<sup>79</sup> In other regions, such as

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<sup>73</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Istog, 16 February 2021.

<sup>74</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Gracanica, 9 March 2021.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Lipjan, 16 February 2021.

<sup>76</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Kaçanik, 3 March 2021.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Novobërdë, 3 March 2021.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Prizren, 25 February 2021.

<sup>79</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Prizren, 25 February 2021.

Drenas/Glogovac, the local police have claimed that they not have mechanisms at the local level that can do an early warning of extremism and radicalism but instead have a constant contact with the Ministry of Internal Affairs which is considered more competent for early detection and warning.<sup>80</sup> In Deçan/Deçane, the Islamic Community was not aware of whether the municipality has taken measures to address radicalism and extremism. But they expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of local police to tackle local and everyday insecurities.<sup>81</sup> Local stakeholders have also acknowledged the lack of appropriate coordination and cooperation between municipal authorities and village councils.<sup>82</sup>

Since local authorities have limited competencies in tackling serious security threats, they rely on the guidance and support provided by the central government authorities. Notably, the role of the Division for Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalized Persons (DPRRP) remains indispensable in coordinating activities and interventions with local actors. Although it has relatively successfully managed to implement activities both at the central and local level, municipal authorities remain uninformed of the work of DPRRP, and sometimes, it's very existence.<sup>83</sup> However, this is symptomatic of the fact that the DPRRP was created through an ad-hoc decision-making process reflecting the pressing security challenges of that time. As a result of this, the DPRRP has showed limited capability to consolidate all actors under a uniform and clear hierarchical policy model. Thus, as part of this research with local stakeholders, we explored how satisfied they are with the support of central government.

The results show there is a split among those municipalities which recognize the efforts and support of central government and those municipalities which are not satisfied with the work of central government. Local stakeholders in municipalities with better outlook of support received from the central government have recognized the positive contribution made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in organizing coordinating meetings with local authorities, which has been an important space to understand the broader trends of security in Kosovo and share knowledge and experiences in tackling various

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<sup>80</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Drenas, 23 February 2021.

<sup>81</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Deçan, 24 February 2021.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Kamenice, 23 February 2021.

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 13 June 2021.

threats, including radicalization.<sup>84</sup> Though majority of local stakeholders have highlighted that beyond such occasional gatherings, no tailored support has been provided to local authorities to tackle violent extremism and other local insecurities.<sup>85</sup> In particular, they have mentioned the lack of support and capacity-building and training to handle the reintegration of persons who have returned from foreign wars. When asked how supportive has been the central government in preventing and combating violent extremism in your municipality, a representative from the municipal council for safety in community in Klinë/Klina stated:

*“The central government has barely helped us in preventing and combating violent extremism. In recent years, fortunately, we have not needed help or cooperation, as there have been no cases of extremism or violent radicalism, but I think the government should do more in this regard and be closer to us.”<sup>86</sup>*

Other members of the council for safety in community in Hani i Elezit/Elez Han and Istog/Istok highlighted that the lack of support from the central government has significantly limited their contribution to preventing violent extremism and dealing with those returned from foreign conflicts.<sup>87</sup> Similar, dissatisfaction with the support of central government is noted in Prizren, Kaçanik/Kaçanik, and Mamushe/Mamuša. In the majority of Kosovo municipalities, local police officers have highlighted that there is no ongoing and direct support from the central government to deal with the prevention, detection, and mitigation of potential cases of radicalization.<sup>88</sup> Though, central government have had a significant impact and have provided active assistance to returnees from Syria.<sup>89</sup> In other words, the cooperation between central and local authorities it is mostly reactive, namely when a specific case of radicalization comes to the attention of authorities. There have been instances when awareness-raising and educational activities are organized, but that has mostly taken part in the period between 2015 and 2019, when

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<sup>84</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Gjakove, 25 February 2021.

<sup>85</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Ferizaj, 26 February 2021.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Kline, 26 February 2021.

<sup>87</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Hani i Elezit, 25 February 2021.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Kamenica, 23 February 2021.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Kaçanik, 3 March 2021.

most of the work is done to implement the national policies on preventing violent extremism in Kosovo. Local civil society activists have also expressed dissatisfaction with the support local authorities have received from the central government in handling sensitive cases of radicalization.<sup>90</sup> So, in general, there seems to be an expectation among local stakeholders that the central government should take preventing measures as well as counter violent extremism to ensure that local communities are not given a bad image and labelled as place of extremism.<sup>91</sup>

The findings across all municipalities clearly note of there is a lack of inter-institutional cooperation and coordination in tackling radicalization. On the one hand, the low prevalence of cases has resulted in a reactive approach both among central authorities and local stakeholders. Yet, on the other hand, the lack of a comprehensive framework that regulates clearly the division of responsibilities among the central and local authorities seems to have impacted significantly the work of local stakeholders in tackling radicalization. Thus, these identified discrepancies considerably undermine the impact policy interventions on the ground and expose the need to ensure that central and local authorities work more closely in addressing emerging insecurities on the ground.

### Strategies for tackling religious radicalization

The final set of questions that local stakeholders were asked to share their perspectives on concerned the most appropriate strategies and approaches for tackling radicalization and violent extremism at the local level. Across the board, majority of respondents have expressed the preference for social-educational and restorative measures rather than punitive measures for tackling local insecurities and violent extremism. Proper education is considered the most effective approach for preventing radicalism and extremism. In particular, education of young people about religious, political, and ethnic tolerance is considered a good way to prevent harmful social practices.<sup>92</sup> Across all municipalities, local stakeholders have highlighted the crucial role of three forms and actors of education in Kosovo which can make a difference in preventing radicalism: 1) formal education and vocational

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with a Representative of Civil Society Organisations, Klina, 26 February 2021.

<sup>91</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Dragash, 26 February 2021.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

training via the school system; 2) informal education via community based and NGO-led campaigns; 2) and religious education via the formal and institutionalized religious institutions. The combination of these three forms of education is considered crucial for ensuring that young people and the public in general are not misinformed and misguided to join and practice radicalism and other harming conduct.<sup>93</sup> As a respondent in Mitrovica South stated:

*“Organizing debates in public places but also in religious and school institutions, supporting NGOs aiming at the emancipation and democratization of society, various joint activities, socializing with affected people are considered as alternative approaches to treat and prevent radicalism and extremism”.*<sup>94</sup>

Similarly, for Kosovo police, the best approach to address the problem of religious and ethnic radicalism is not punitive measures but holding lectures and trainings and supporting sports and cultural activities which would take young people away from harmful practices.<sup>95</sup> As a police officer in Kaçanik/Kacanik stated:

*“The best way should start from the level of education, where every school has teachers, who should identify students in the early stages of radicalization and inform the institutions, and also lectures should be held in schools by professional people who are dealing with the fight against religious extremism.”*<sup>96</sup>

As discussed earlier in this study, the presence of informal mosques and preaching of radical forms of Islam by unauthorized imams is considered a major factor which has pushed around 300 citizens of Kosovo to join the civil war in Syria and Iraq. To remedy this issue, local respondents have highlighted the importance of involving the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) through awareness-raising lectures, increase cooperation between the ICK and other religious communities, ensure proper education of imams and the curriculum on consider religious education in schools.<sup>97</sup> These findings are congruent with

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<sup>93</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Hani i Elezit, 25 February 2021.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Assembly, Mitrovica south, 15 February 2021.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Ferizaj, 26 February 2021.

<sup>96</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Kaçanik. 3 March 2021.

<sup>97</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Malisheve, 26 February 2021.

previous research which has shown that the ICK had played a positive role in preventing radicalization and violent extremism. A representative of the ICK made the case for the introduction of religion within formal education as a way to ensure that proper religious knowledge is communicated to young people and eliminate the possibilities for alternative and radical religious education provided by private mosques.<sup>98</sup>

The second major approach for tackling violent extremism identified by local stakeholders focuses on reintegration rather than on marginalization of persons affected by the phenomenon of violent extremism. On 17 July 2021, Kosovo repatriated 11 citizens from the conflict zones in Syria. On this occasion, Kosovo's Minister of Internal Affairs, Xhelal Sfeqla stated that:

*"Kosovo will always be the home of its citizens. Those who have committed crimes, here or abroad, will be prosecuted. The woman and children we have returned today need our help and support...Our government is helping them return to their families so that they can reintegrate into their district."<sup>99</sup>*

Local stakeholders have highlighted the importance of designing socio-economic support and psychosocial programmes, which would contribute to deradicalization and gradual reintegration in the community of those affected by radicalization and violent extremism. As noted by a senior officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo:

*"The main need and demand of the returnees is employment. When they return, we provide them basic necessary things: food, documentations, social schemes, and mental health assistance. After the initial phase, we support them with vocational training, we help them to be ready to be employed and work".<sup>100</sup>*

A police officer in Malishevë/Mališevo stated "the best way to address the problem of religious and ethnic radicalism is to create programs for the integration of extremists through their education without seeing prison as a solution (because they can spread the ideology even among prisoners)".<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Deçan, 24 February 2021.

<sup>99</sup> Kallxo. 'Kosova kthen 11 shtetas nga Siria, mes tyre një grua me fëmijë', 17 July 2021. Available at: <https://kallxo.com/lajm/kosova-kthen-11-shtetas-nga-zonat-e-konfliktit-ne-siri/>.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Prishtina, 19 February 2021

<sup>101</sup> Interview with a Kosovo Police Officer, Malisheve, 26 February 2021.

Similarly, a representative of Islamic Community of Kosovo in Drenas/Gllogovac argued that “adequate treatment of people who are affected by these phenomena is considered as the best way to prevent radicalism and extremism.”<sup>102</sup> Another member of the Municipal Council for Safety in Community in Lipjan/Lipljane added:

*“Our municipality will support reintegration, especially for the children who are victims, they have made that terrible journey, some of them were born there, some of them were dragged that we saw on TV, their wives may have suffered other things even now they are not guilty, it is the head of the family who initiated this work, but they suffer. We are for the child not to be left on the streets, not to turn into beggars.”<sup>103</sup>*

Similarly, there is strong willingness among the representatives of Islamic community at the local level to cooperate with the government on tackling sources of religion-based insecurity. Their representative from Podujevë/Podujevo added that “the Islamic Community is prepared and ready to train all those who have extreme ideas and misunderstandings in religious beliefs.”<sup>104</sup> Yet, local stakeholders have argued that proper reintegration programmes require proper investment by the central government and a wholistic approach which ensures non-recurrence of extremism.

The viewpoints of local stakeholders on most appropriate strategies for tackling radicalization highlight the need for investing more on public and religious education rather than focus on punitive and criminalization interventions. They highlight the important role that hybrid education, civil society groups, and communities themselves have in shaping knowledge and perception on religion and society, in promoting religious tolerance and inclusion, and in tackling psychosocial needs of marginalized communities. In a nutshell, local stakeholders implicitly call for a comprehensive social intervention rather than political intervention in addressing radicalization problems.

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<sup>102</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Drenas, 23 February 2021.

<sup>103</sup> Interview with a Member of Municipal Council for Safety in Community, Lipjan, 16 February 2021

<sup>104</sup> Interview with a Local Representative of the Islamic Community of Kosovo, Podujeve, 18 February 2021.



## Conclusion and recommendations

This study has mapped out the main perspectives of local stakeholders across Kosovo on the prevalence of religious radicalization at the community level. By way of conclusion, this section summarizes the key findings and offers a number of recommendations. The overall finding of this study is that at the time when this research was conducted religious radicalization is not considered as the most prevalent threat to local security in Kosovo. Instead, perceived threats to security vary from one municipality to another. Local stakeholders have a wide range of perception of different threats to security ranging from social misconduct and crime to ethnic and political violence, to environmental degradation and road safety.

**RECOMMENDATION 1: At the strategic and policy level, it is crucial to revise and expand the nature of insecurities in Kosovo. Future security strategies should pay greater attention to ideological and ethnic forms of radicalization, which are overshadowed by exclusive focus on religious radicalization. Expanding different varieties of insecurities could help governmental stakeholders devise more reality-adequate policies and have greater scope for anticipating, preventing and responding to ever changing nature of insecurity in Kosovo.**

Despite an overwhelming consensus among local stakeholders that religious radicalism does not constitute a serious threat to local security, local stakeholders we have identified a number of structural and situational factors that have influenced Kosovo citizens to join the conflict in Syria. The first set of factors are structural and have to do with socio-economic and political injustice. Namely, what has pushed a limited number of individuals to radicalize has been the prevalence of unemployment, bad governance and corruption, and lack of social justice, which has narrowed the trust on the state institutions to enhance social and political life and on society to nurture solidarity. The second set of factors concerns more situational and individual circumstances which have pushed a limited number of individuals to radicalize. They mostly concern neglect, trauma, and misguidance by informal religious preachers, and impact of social media and transnational solidarity with perceived human

suffering and conflicts abroad, as well as societal exclusion of those practicing non-traditional forms of Islam.

**RECOMMENDATION 2: Efforts for tackling religious radicalization should be tailored with broader socio-economic development measures at the community level. Future strategic planning requires developing whole-of-society approach to building community resilience and preventing radicalization. Such an approach needs to incorporate major central and local stakeholders and take a human security approach to the needs and rights of citizens.**

As discussed earlier in this study, the Government of Kosovo deserves recognition for its efforts for combating religious radicalization through preventive, punitive and restorative measures. The preventive measures include policy development to guide the work of central and local institutions to address the root causes and triggers of radicalization through awareness-raising campaigns, resilience building measures, and consultations with stakeholders and affected communities. The punitive measures include passing of legislation prohibiting participation in foreign conflicts as well as legal prosecution of those implicated in serious crimes and human rights abuses. The restorative measures include repatriation and reintegration of those returning from the conflict zones. Most of these measures are coordinated and managed by the central authorities in Kosovo. However, municipal authorities are also expected to play a role in preventing and addressing radicalization and violent extremism.

Local stakeholders indicate that there are general security mechanisms in place at the municipality level, which monitor, among others, the situation with religious-based radicalization. But this study finds that the perceived low risk of radicalization and the shifting security priorities in Kosovo have dictated the low intensity and response of local authorities in Kosovo. A significant large number of respondents have highlighted that in most of the municipalities there are no specific and proactive activities to prevent, detect and respond to violent extremism primarily due to the inexistence or low prevalence of such cases, which are handled through ordinary policing activities. Others have highlighted the lack of capacity and resources which explains the moderate efforts of local authorities to tackle sources and drivers of radicalization. Local stakeholders also have different views on how much support do local authorities receive from the central government in countering violent extremism. While there is general satisfaction and acknowledgement among

local stakeholders on the important work undertaken by the MIA and other central security structures, there is also criticism on the limited involvement of local authorities and information sharing in preventive and reactive interventions to combat radicalization and its potential translation into violent extremism. While municipalities need to move away from a reactive approach of treating cases of radicalization, DPRRP must increase its support for local stakeholders. In other words, the DPRRP should take a proactive role and serve as a coordinating body in ensuring that municipal responses are in line with the Government's strategic objectives.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** The MIA through DPRRP within future strategic framework should consider establishing clear policy measures that delineates the division of responsibilities among and between central authorities and municipal stakeholders. There is also scope to enhance inter-institutional cooperation, which can be regulated through adopting secondary legislation.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:** Municipal stakeholders with the support of civil society organizations should undertake their own initiatives that support the rehabilitation and reintegration of turned foreign fighters and those more widely affected by religious radicalization.

**RECOMMENDATION 6:** The Government of Kosovo together with the donor community working on security issues in Kosovo should consider supporting a national network of community-based NGOs that work on local peace, security, and democracy to monitor the work of local authorities, support rehabilitation and reintegration of those affected by radicalism, as well as engage in community outreach and education on the need for eradication of all forms of radicalization.

# Mapping Local Perspectives on Radicalization in Kosovo

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